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Abstract: Since the 1980s, a number of frameworks have been proposed for understanding the concept of information 
system (IS) failure. Two approaches to IS failures seem particularly important: the concept of Expectation Failure and the 
concept of Termination Failure. We argue that there is an extra dimension to the problem that is not covered by those 
descriptive models, which we call the Outsourced IS Failure (OISF). To explain the OISF we draw on agency theory, 
which views the problems that occur in outsourced environments as the results of three factors: goal differences, risk 
behaviour differences and information asymmetry. Although the (positivistic) agency theory has already been used to 
describe phenomena of failure in IT relations there is still a lack of empirical evidence.  
 
This paper brings the results of the attempts of falsification of the agency theory in situations of OISF. A positivistic case 
study research was conducted based on multiple cases in SMEs. The choice for qualitative research is based on the 
accessibility of well documented secondary data in litigation files of failed IS projects. Eight cases of IS project failures 
subject to litigation were selected.  
 
We conclude that the agency theory has strong prediction and explanation power for OISF. However some adjustments 
are needed to the agency theory. The theory seems to work in two ways, opportunistic behaviour is also observed on the 
side of the principal. The findings indicate that lack of trust is a prominent determinant for failure.  
 
Keywords: IS outsourcing, SMEs, IS failures, Principal Agent theory, Organisational and Personal Trust  
1. Introduction 
Despite the numerous success stories illustrating the advantages of bringing information technology into 
organisations, it is broadly accepted that the processes of designing, developing and implementing are 
cumbersome and not straightforward. Recent and older reports show that IS projects frequently fail. The 
broad and elaborate research on IS failures has been conducted for more than four decennia (Ackoff, 1967, 
Lucas, 1975; Lyytinen & Hirschheim, 1987; Sauer, 1993; Keil, 1995; Beynon-Davies, 1999; Schmidt et al, 
2001; Ewushi-Mensah, 2003; Iacovou & Dexter, 2005; Avison et al, 2006).  
 
IS failures can be divided in expectation (Lyytinen, 1987) and termination (Sauer, 1993) failures. Expectation 
failures can be categorised in correspondence, process and interaction failures. Correspondence failures 
occur when IS are evaluated towards previous defined design objectives. A lack of correspondence between 
design objectives and evaluation is seen as a failure. Process failures occur when there is unsatisfactory 
development performance, i.e., one fails to produce a workable system or to deliver within the budget 
constraints of time and costs. Process failures are sometimes called ‘runaways’ or escalating projects 
(Iacovou, 2004; Keil, 1995). Interaction failures are situated within the mismatch between requirements and 
user acceptance. An interaction failure appears when an IS is not used. In summary, an IS expectation 
failure is the inability of an IS to meet the expectations of the stakeholders.  
 
Sauer brought up the more pragmatic concept of the termination failure (Sauer, 1993). According to Sauer 
an IS failure can only occur when the development process or operation of an IS causes dissatisfied 
stakeholders to abandon the project. 
 
One of the most intriguing questions is: why do IS still fail if we known what causes a failure? The answer is 
that we still do not really understand the nature of IS failures. Various small, apparently insignificant factors 
interact with each other leading to a complex amalgam that is hard to identify. If additional problems occur or 
if the root causes of the original problems are not effectively addressed, the problems grow worse. Software 
engineering has only evolved during the last half of the twentieth century and its culture is still immature. In 
times of rapidly advancing technology and fierce competition good engineering practices are reluctantly 
adopted. Being able to provide complex software solutions of good quality has become critical in 
differentiating success from failure.  
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Not all causes of failure have an objective nature or seem to be connected with technology but tend to lean 
on fashion, perception, expectancy, pressure, internal or external politics and cognitive processes. Smith and 
Keil believe that some failures involve psychological, social and organisational issues that cannot be 
addressed with techniques such as the critical path method or joint application development (Smith & Keil, 
2003:70).  
 
We argue that there is an extra dimension to IS failures that is not covered by those descriptive models, 
which we call the Outsourced IS Failure (OISF). An OISF is a failure that occurs during an IS project in an 
outsourced environment. We use the taxonomy of Lacity and Hirschheim (in Dibbern et al., 2004:10) of 
outsourcing options and focus on Project Management. Some academics have already pointed out that 
outsourcing increases risks leading to IS failures (Natovich, 2003; Aubert et al, 2003).  
 
We conducted a case study research based on multiple cases in SMEs. The choice for qualitative research 
was based on the accessibility of well documented secondary data in litigation files of failed IS projects. Eight 
cases of IS project failures were selected. SMEs are our domain of interest since those enterprises tend to 
outsource their IS projects very intensively due to their dependency on external IT knowledge.  
 
To understand OISF we draw on agency theory, which views problems that occur in outsourced 
environments as the results of three factors: goal differences, risk behaviour differences and information 
asymmetry. We crafted the agency theory to induce propositions that were testable in our experiments. 
Together with agency theory we searched for rivalry and competing theories that could help explain 
phenomenons at a more detailed level. We formulated propositions from organisational trust theory (Zaheer 
et al., 1998) and prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Both theories were already used in IS 
research (Lander et al., 2004; Rose & Rose, 2004).  
 
The remainder of the paper describes the relation of IT and SMEs, followed by the relevant literature on 
agency theory and outsourcing, and a description of the research method. The final section includes 
discussion and conclusions, as well as limitations.  
2. IT and SMEs 
Research and literature have highlighted the definitional problems of SMEs. Companies differ in size, 
location, business, financial performance, maturity and management style. Europe defines SMEs as 
independent businesses that employ less than 250 people and with either a turnover of less than 50 million 
euro or a balance sheet total of less than 43 million euro. SMEs can be split up in micro, small and medium-
sized enterprises (European Commission, 2003). Even with this definition SMEs are diverse. Some are 
dynamic and flexible with a great power to innovate and a vast range of diversity. Some are based on family 
involvement and embedded in local business environments. Some others are start-ups: fragile organisations 
striving for survival. Our research focus on genuine SMEs or in the European definition: medium-sized and 
small enterprises.  
 
In the years of the dotcom hype many believed that IT would enable SMEs to compete with large companies. 
However a lack of readiness for networking with other enterprises and reluctance to use advanced IT proved 
otherwise. SMEs perceive little incentive to change business models when returns are unclear (OECD, 
2004). Research also showed that SMEs do not excel in knowledge retention and obtaining a sustainable 
competitive advantage. There is a slower adoption of IT in SMEs than in large enterprises. The 
methodologies that lead to successful IS implementations in large organisations can therefore not be 
extrapolated to SMEs, since we are dealing with a completely different economical, cultural and managerial 
environment. Existing mechanisms of IT governance do not work as such in SMEs where the decision 
making is mostly centred on one person (Southern & Tilley, 2000). Despite the efforts to develop specific 
derivative methods of governing IT in SMEs, like the Cobit QuickStart method for practitioners, the 
implementation is rather disappointing. (IT Governance Institute, 2003).  
 
Due to their small scale and hence a lack of in house IT-skills, SMEs depend more on vendors than large 
companies (Thong et al., 1994: 210). This does not mean that outsourcing is without risks or problems. From 
a managerial point of view we associate risk in IT outsourcing with negative outcomes. Two risk scenarios 
that are of special interest for this research are lock-ins and disputes. A lock-in is a situation where a client 
cannot get out of a relationship without extra costs (Bahli and Rivard, 2003: 213). Disputes can be separated 
in litigation and non-litigation. Not all disputes lead to litigation.  
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3. Principal agent theory and outsourcing 
The (positivistic) agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989) has already been used to 
describe phenomena in IS relations, however there is still a lack of empirical evidence especially in situations 
that lead to actual failures. Many IS in SMEs are implemented via an outsourced project. Those projects are 
conducted in an environment in which there is information asymmetry. This is typically the situation of a SME 
(principal) and an Independent Software Vendor or ISV (agent). It is assumed that the agent often has 
private information about the quality of the IS that is not available to the principal. According to agent theory 
agents can therefore act in their own best interest.(Tuttle, 1997).  
 
Agency theory addresses relationships in which one party (the principal) delegates work to another (the 
agent) who performs the work according to a mutually agreed contract. Both parties are self-interested with 
incongruent goals. This leads to two problems: 1) ex-ante, before signing the contract: the problem of 
adverse selection and 2) ex-post, after signing the contract: the problem of moral hazard.  
 
Adverse selection arises pre-contractually because the agent possesses private or hidden information about 
the real quality of his service and the principal is unable to find out that information. This leads to information 
asymmetry and puts the principal in a disadvantaged position since the principal is faced with a pool of 
bidders with often insufficient qualifications. The principal cannot easily distinguish the ‘bad cars or lemons’ 
from the good ones (Akerlof, 1970: 489).  
 
Moral hazard arises post-contractually when the principal is unable to observe and verify the actions of the 
agent and may be faced with an agent engaged in hidden actions and not acting in the principal’s interest 
because of goal differences between both parties. 
 
Hidden information and hidden action (sometimes named opportunistic behaviour) are coming into play 
because the SME-principle cannot monitor the agent’s behaviour and performance without agency costs 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976:6).  
 
Besides asymmetric information and goal differences, there is an important third factor: risk behaviour 
differences. The implementation of an IS is highly risky since the outcome is not always stated in measurable 
outputs and only partly verifiable by organisation members. The likelihood of failure looms large because of 
this outcome uncertainty. This gives rise to an entrepreneurial risk situated initially with the principal. The 
transfer of that risk to the agent is not straightforward since both parties’ express risk behaviour differences. 
The principal is assumed risk neutral and the agent risk averse. This assumption is based on the argument 
‘[…] that agents are unable to diversify their employment […] and principals, who are capable of diversifying 
their investments, should be risk neutral.’ (Eisenhardt 1989: 60). However it is assumed that the principal is 
risk averse when choosing for a “buy” option (Eisenhardt 1989: 65). It is our belief that on the issue of risk 
behaviour differences the prospect theory is of special interest. When principals are faced with adverse 
possibilities there is an overweighting of certainty (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979:269) 
 
Agency theory is a well-known and used IS-theory, especially in the research of IS and outsourcing (Dibbern 
et al., 2004; Aubert, 2005; Bahli and Rivard, 2003). While researchers acknowledge the importance of 
agency problems, most treat it unidirectional. Opportunistic behaviour is considered to be found with the 
agent. Very few offer a deeper understanding of how and why agency problems occur. Using case study 
research we reveal and explain the surfacing and culminating of agency problems in a bidirectional way.  
 
When principal and agent are contracting the negotiated transaction can never be described perfectly. 
Anderlini and Felli state that: ‘[...]the contracting parties may lack the necessary degree of rationality 
necessary to describe exactly the various states of nature in the ex-ante contract they draw up.’ (Anderline & 
Felli, 2004:5). The role of trust in an outsourced IS environment can therefore not be overestimated. 
Recently a lot of research has been carried out on the relation of trust and IS (Sabherwal, 1999; Lander et 
al., 2004).  
 
In our research we combine agency theory with prospect theory and with organisational and personal trust 
theory (Zaheer et al., 1998) to induce testable propositions and to craft patterns in the experimental findings. 
So far we formulated the following propositions:  
 P1 - When asymmetries in information are combined with opportunism, hidden actions may arise 
from both the agent and the principal.  
Electronic Journal Information Systems Evaluation Volume 11 Issue 2 2008 (73-82) 
www.ejise.com ©Academic Conferences Ltd 76
 P2 – The risk behaviour of agents can evolve from ‘risk averse’ to ‘risk taken’ if the possibility of 
a lock-in scenario becomes possible.  
 P3 – Structured controls are not sufficient to eliminate opportunistic behaviour in an outsourced 
IS project 
 P4 – Agents postulate their prospects (proposals) as certainties  
 P5 - Trust limits the need for structured controls by reducing the perceived need to guard against 
opportunistic behaviour  
4. Research method 
We have chosen for a qualitative and positivistic IS case study research strategy based on multiple cases. 
The choice for qualitative research is based on the accessibility of well documented secondary data in 
litigation files of failed IS projects. Eight cases of IS project failures were selected. The positivistic stance of 
the research is our personal conviction that there is an objective reality of failed outsourced IS projects in 
SMEs. However those phenomena are embedded in an organisational context which is not separable from 
the unit of analysis. There are also definitely more variables to be studied than there is data available. This is 
a situation where the case study is an ideal research strategy (Yin, 2003; Lee, 1989:35). According to Yin a 
case study research is useful when a phenomenon cannot be studied outside the context in which it occurs 
or where the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin, 2003:13). Sauer 
shares the opinion that research to IS failures is best done by case study (Sauer, 1993). The development of 
the research design and methodology is inspired by the work of researchers experienced in case study 
research (Eisenhardt, 1989, Lee, 1989; Dubé & Paré, 2003). 
 
A case study protocol was developed to minimize the errors and biases in the study. The protocol contains 
all procedures, observation protocols and general rules that are followed during the research. The case 
study protocol offers a guideline for investigators and reviewers who will help in the evaluation of the cases.  
 
We used a longitudinal approach in all cases. Three sources of evidence were used to ensure construct 
validity: 1) documents, 2) focus and open-ended interviews and 3) direct and participant observations. 
Project documentation, minutes from steering committee meetings, memorandums and letters were 
analyzed. Documents were delivered by three sources: plaintiff, defendant and expert witness. The plaintiff 
and defendant documents were often the same but were brought into litigation for opposed opinions. All 
expert witness reports were exposed by cross examination of all parties and were corrected if material errors 
did occur. This resulted in an extra triangulation of the available data. The interviews were recorded on 
audiotapes and written down in reports and sent to all parties for cross examination. All interviews took place 
in the present of all parties and the expert witness. The case study sites were visited at least four times for 
the purpose of doing interviews and direct observations. Additional data was collected during those site 
visits. In two cases (Stones and Boxcars) evidence was obtained as participant observer. The data coming 
from all sources was coded by means of a coding scheme, which is part of the case study protocol. The 
coding scheme separates the basic data from the metadata (the documents, reports, sheets …). The coding 
scheme was designed to avoid data contamination. All data is stored in a computerised case study database 
and links are made between basic data and metadata. The data is retrievable by computer but is also 
available in original and raw format for reviewers. The data analysis is based on alternate template strategy 
which is a pattern-matching technique (Langley, 1999). Data was analyzed in two steps. First step was a 
within-case analysis to review the unique patterns of each case. Second a cross-case analysis was 
conducted in search for common patterns. The cases were selected to allow comparison and to maximise 
variation as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Selected cases 
 Type of Project Result Dispute Resolution 
Case Foam ERP implementation Process Failure Litigation 
Case Woody Software development and implementation Process Failure Litigation 
Case Mach ERP implementation Expectation Failure Litigation 
Case Bupo Software development Process Failure Litigation 
Case Dybo Software development and implementation Process Failure Litigation 
Case Stones ERP implementation Expectation Failure No litigation 
Case Boxcars DIS implementation Expectation Failure No litigation 
Case Hero Software development and implementation Escalation Failure Litigation 
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Similarities pertain to the size of the enterprises; all principal sites are SMEs and the failed result of the 
project. In terms of variation four projects are ERP implementations, three projects are software development 
and implementation projects and one project is a software development without implementation.  
 
Case Boxcars is a consortium of 60 car dealers who contracted together for a Dealer Information System 
(DIS). Customizing took place for all ERP implementations in the observed case. Two cases (Stones and 
Boxcars) were subject to litigation however an alternative dispute resolution was applied. 
 
Table 2 gives an overview of the observations in our research. For each case we look at: 
 Type of contract: according to agency theory two types of contracts are possible: outcome- 
based and behaviour-based. In some cases a mixed form was discovered in which some parts 
of the contact were outcome-based (in particular software licences) and others (in particular 
consultancy fees) were behaviour-based.  
 Structural controls: appropriate mechanisms including deliverables, reporting arrangements, 
meeting schedules, penalty clauses for governing the project. We searched for two aspects of 
structural controls: stipulated in contract and performed during the course of the project.  
 External consultancy: engagement of external expertise.  
 Information asymmetry (private information of agent and of principal): traces of private 
information at both parties.  
 Hidden actions (of principal and of agent): traces of hidden actions.  
 Adverse selection: adverse selection takes place before signing the contract (ex-ante). The 
traces could only be observed ex-post, once the project was started.  
 Prospect framing: the way (positive or negative) the agent is making his proposal to the principal  
 Vendor lock: a vendor lock is seen as a lock-in situation in which the principal cannot get out of 
his relationship with the agent.  
 Lack of commitment: includes lack of oversight and engagement by executives  
 Trust level: three levels of trust: deterrence-based or calculus-based, knowledge-based and 
identification-based trust (Lander et al., 2004) 
 Trust deterioration: decline of trust  
 Trust building mechanisms: Lander et al. presented a list of trust building mechanisms in 
outsourced IS development projects (integrity, predictability, communications, commitment, 
sharing control)  
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Table 2: Overview and summary of the case observations 
 Case Foam Case Woody Case Mach Case Bupo 
Principal Manufacturer 
(plastic foam)  
 
Trader 
(lumber)  
Trader and manufacturer (veneered 
boards, ceiling coverings, wall 
planks) 
ISV  
Turnover €50 million n.a. €12.75 million €475000 
Staff 100 White collars 
450 Blue collars 
 146 (total)  8 white 
collars 
IT Maturity CMM level 1 CMM level 1 CMM level 1 CMM level 1 
Application  ERP + 
customizing 
ERP 
development 
ERP + customizing Office 
application 
Cost Original: €644000 
Final: €1.290000 
€372000 €90000 €50000 
Litigation Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Type of contract Outcome-based Outcome-
based 
Mixed  Outcome-
based 
Structural controls in 
contract and in project 
Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/No Yes/No 
External consultancy No No Yes No 
Private information 
(agent) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Private information 
(principal)  
Yes No Yes No 
Hidden actions agent Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hidden actions principal Yes No Yes No 
Adverse selection  No No No Yes 
Prospect framing Positive Positive Positive - 
Vendor lock Yes No No No 
Lack of commitment 
(agent) 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Lack of commitment 
(principal)  
No No No No 
Level of trust Deterrence  Deterrence  Deterrence  Deterrence  
Trust deterioration Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Trust-building 
mechanism 
No No No No 
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Table 2: Overview and summary of the case observations (cont.) 
 Case Dybo Case Stones Case Boxcars Case Hero 
Principal Trader and 
manufacturer 
(lumber) 
Manufacturer 
(stones, street 
furniture) 
Dealer in cars  Contractor 
(waste removal)  
Turnover €15.65 million €31.25 million n.a. n.a. 
Staff 16 (total) 80 white collars 
120 blue collars 
-  5 
IT Maturity CMM level 0  CMM Level 2 CMM level 1 CMM level 0 
Application  ERP 
development 
ERP + 
customizing 
DIS + 
customizing 
Office and DB 
application 
development 
Cost €50000 €750000 60x€75000 €75000 
Litigation Yes No (dispute) No (disputes) Yes  
Type of contract Mixed Behaviour-based Mixed Outcome-based 
Structural controls in 
contract and in project 
No/No Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/No 
External consultancy No No Yes No 
Private information (agent) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Private information 
(principal)  
No No No Yes 
Hidden actions agent No Yes Yes No 
Hidden actions principal No No No No 
Adverse selection  No Yes Yes No 
Prospect framing - Positive Positive Positive 
Vendor lock Yes Yes Yes No 
Lack of commitment 
(agent) 
No No No No 
Lack of commitment 
(principal)  
Yes No Yes Yes 
Level of trust Deterrence  Knowledge Deterrence  Deterrence  
Trust deterioration Yes No No Yes 
Trust-building mechanism No No No No 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions  
The research has not come to an end but some preliminary conclusions can already be drawn.  
 
First of all it is apparent that avoiding OISFs can be very cumbersome. We learned that the establishment of 
structured controls during the implementation of an IS project is not sufficient to avoid OISFs. In the 
observed cases we could noticed that a loss of trust was often a very strong determinant for failure, despite 
structured controls. Trust is often connected to agency problems, although agency theory does not take trust 
into account. In the literature on IS failures trust is often ignored. In six cases we could observe trust 
deterioration, although the level of trust was already initially of deterrence-based.  
 
In all cases we observed asymmetric information and found out that principal agent theory has a strong 
validity but that works in a bidirectional way. All agents had private information concerning the project, which 
is in line with agency theory assumptions. However we could observe moreover that in at least three cases 
there were also principals with private information relevant to the project. In two cases (Foam and Mach) one 
could detect even hidden actions on behalf of the principal. This was already suggested by Moynihan and 
Aubert.  
‘Agency theory views the exchange primarily from the perspective of the principal. But what of the 
agent’s perspective? What strategies can agents use to protect themselves from potentially 
opportunistic or other unfavourable forms of behaviour on the part of the principal?’ (Moynihan, 2002: 
378) 
‘Both clients and vendors tend to behave opportunistically when entering into a contract and this can 
lead to mutual disadvantage.’ (Aubert, 2003: 183) 
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The principal in case Mach made a contract for implementing two systems in two separate business units. 
During the project the principal sold one of the business units without informing the agent.  
 
An outcome-based contract is seen as a solution of controlling opportunistic behaviour of the agent as 
suggested by agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989:60). However the outcomes of the contracts in terms of 
measurable goal indicators were in all cases very poorly specified. Hardware and software licences are 
mostly mentioned in a detailed way in all contracts, but the real outcome is often defined in very obscure and 
vague terms. This is a phenomenon not typically for SMEs, but points out to the problem of value perception 
and measurement in IT investments (Bannister & Remenyi, 2003). We could observe that SME-principals 
often naively interpret their contract solely as a fixed-price contract, although this is not always formally true. 
On the other hand the uncertainty of the outcome of an IS implementation gives rise to a difference in risk 
behaviour which is well described by agency theory.  
 
The overall IT maturity of the principal was assessed during the research and was scored to the CMM 
maturity levels also used in Cobit. Since not al IT processes occur in SMEs (IT Governance, 2003) it is fairly 
easy to assess the IT maturity. The overall maturity was in all cases very low, which is very typical for SMEs.  
 
An explanation for the problem of adverse selection is given by Akerlof (Akerlof, 1970). ISVs that are active 
on a SME marketplace tend to comply with the Akerlofs Lemon-theory. However there are other mechanisms 
involved that can be explained by prospect theory. Further research however is needed here.  
 
In appendix A we provide more information on the observations of the project characteristics private 
information and hidden actions.  
 
This paper represents a first step in an on-going research. The approach adopted here is comparable with 
forensic investigation where a chain-of-evidence in a post-mortem is carefully built up. The process of 
revealing the information patterns in the experimental data is tedious and far from straight forward. Much 
remains to be done to improve the matching of the theoretical and empirical patterns.  
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Appendix A 
Observations of the project characteristics private information and hidden actions 
Case Foam 
Private information of agent: Agent knew that a higher budget was needed for customisation 
Agent sold a computer with a lower internal memory capacity than correctly 
calculated by the dimensioning program 
Private information of principal: Principal did not inform the agent that an internal BPR program in the 
manufacturing division failed  
Hidden actions agent: Agent starts working on customizations without informing the principal 
Agent did not give detailed information on work performed 
Agent assigned an inexperienced project leader to the project  
Agent assigned inexperienced programmers to the project 
Hidden actions principal: Principal assigned an inexperienced project leader to the project 
Case Woody 
Private information of agent: Agent knew that the budget needed was much higher than the proposed one  
Private information of principal: Not observed 
Hidden actions agent: Agent assigned an inexperienced project leader to the project  
Agent assigned inexperienced programmers to the project 
Hidden actions principal: Not observed 
Case Mach 
Private information of agent: Agent sold obsolete software 
Private information of principal: Principal had a plan to sell a business unit  
Hidden actions agent: Agent assigned inexperienced project leader to the project 
Hidden actions principal: Principal sold a business unit during the course of the project 
Case Bupo 
Private information of agent: Agent’s project leader dismissed just after finishing the design of the software 
Private information of principal: Not observed 
Hidden actions agent: Agent assigned inexperienced programmers to the project 
Hidden actions principal: Not observed 
Case Dybo 
Private information of agent: Agent sold software which was not yet fully finished and debugged 
Agent built in old parts of software into the new software 
Private information of principal: Not observed 
Hidden actions agent: Not observed 
Hidden actions principal: Not observed 
Case Stones 
Private information of agent: Agent did not tell the principal that the owner of the ERP package sold his 
software to another vendor 
Software contained licensed programs from third parties 
Agent did not tell the principal that new vendor was involved in a Chapter 11 
procedure 
Private information of principal: Not observed 
Hidden actions agent: Agent modified software without informing the principal  
Agent assigned inexperienced programmers to the project 
Hidden actions principal: Not observed 
Case Boxcars  
Private information of agent: Agent sold software with modifications which were not yet fully finished and 
debugged 
Agent sold software based on old technology 
Agent worked on new software based on new technology 
Private information of principal: Not observed 
Hidden actions agent: Agent modified software without informing the principal (customer) 
Agent installed software without informing the principal (steering committee)  
Hidden actions principal: Not observed 
Case Hero 
Private information of agent: Agent sold a software package as an empty box 
Private information of principal: Principal did not inform the agent of the staff changes  
Principal did not assign a skilled project leader 
Hidden actions agent: Not observed 
Hidden actions principal: Not observed 
 
